Firms write contracts to exploit consumer overconfidence by Grubb, Michael D.
2/24/2016
Firms write contracts to exploit consumer overconfidence
blogs.lse.ac.uk /businessreview/2016/02/24/firms-write-contracts-to-exploit-consumer-overconfidence/
Overconfidence is a common error that can lead people to make poor choices because they misforecast future
product usage and overestimate their abilities to navigate contract terms. The value of a gym membership depends
on how often you think you will go to the gym, and the value of a mobile phone contract depends on how much data
you think you will use. Your willingness to enter into a contract depends on whether you are confident that you can
avoid late fees or other penalties, or whether you worry that such fees will prove difficult to avoid and expensive.
In their aptly titled study of a New England health club, “ Paying Not to Go to the Gym ”, DellaVigna and Malmendier
argue that individuals overpay for gym memberships because they overestimate their own powers of self-control—
they expect to regularly get off the couch to go to the gym, but in fact rarely do. Another common mistake of the
overconfident is to overestimate how quickly they will repay credit-card debt. These overconfident borrowers may
ignore the interest rates that credit-card companies charge after introductory rates expire because they wrongly
expect to pay-off balances within the introductory period—a prediction supported by Ausubel’s study of consumer
responses to credit card offers.
In another example from my own research, I find that overconfidence explains why individuals systematically
choose the wrong monthly mobile-phone plans. Consumers mistakenly believe that they can choose a calling plan
that is, as Goldilocks would say, “just right”, having neither too large an allowance of data that goes wasted, nor too
small an allowance that leads to expensive overage charges. In fact, as an industry executive once told me (and is
also borne out in the data), “people absolutely think they know how much they will use and it’s pretty surprising how
wrong they are.”
Poor choices in gym memberships, credit cards, and mobile-phone plans all result from mistaken beliefs about
future usage of the products. Yet perhaps an even more common error is overestimating one’s ability to navigate
contract terms. For instance, experiments conducted by Silk and Ericson suggest that although people recognize
that they may not follow through to collect mail-in rebates, they still underestimate the extent of the problem.
Similarly, people are often unconcerned by offers that include costly terms such as high late fees, over-limit fees, or
automatic renewal clauses because they think they will be the exception and avoid such penalties and pitfalls. They
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usually aren’t. As a result, overconfident consumers overestimate the benefits and underestimate to costs of
contracts that include these terms.
In each setting described above, overconfidence leads consumers to make bad decisions that cost them money. Yet
this is only the beginning of the story. In a recent article, I focus on further consequences of overconfidence. The first
insight I highlight is that many contractual terms, like mail-in rebates, and late-fees—the very terms that commonly
trip people up—may be included in contracts precisely because people often overestimate their benefits or
underestimate their costs. Absent overconfidence, contracts might be much more straight forward. Why after all do
firms commonly offer mail-in rebates? As Scott Adams’ Dilbert cartoon humorously suggests, firms may offer rebates
to exploit the overconfident who forget to collect them.
A second insight is that competition among firms may fail to protect people from their own mistakes, and we may
need to rely on consumer protection policy instead. However, policies designed to prevent firms from exploiting
overconfidence do not necessarily help consumers. For instance, Matt Osborne and I predict that requiring cellular
carriers to alert customers when they exceed usage allowances (as U.S. carriers must now do) would help
consumers avoid unwanted overage charges. However, we also predict that firms would offset the lost overage fee
revenue by raising monthly fees and making other price changes that actually leave many consumers worse off. In
other cases, however, consumer protection policy can be tremendously successful. Agarwal and co-authors find no
offsetting price response by banks when the 2009 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD)
Act curtailed U.S. credit-card late fees and over-limit fees—instead the entire $12 billion yearly reduction in fees
directly benefits U.S. credit-card holders as intended.
Happily, there is a way forward for regulators hoping to know when to try to help. My analysis shows that two
concrete, measurable statistics—consumers’ sensitivity to prices and the willingness of firms to pass on cost
increases to consumers in the form of higher prices—impact the potential effectiveness of proposed regulations.
Distinguishing markets in which regulation may have limited benefit (as in cellular services) from those in which
regulation may substantially help consumers (as in credit cards) can enable policy makers to intervene when
effective and avoid unnecessary regulation otherwise.
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